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Introduction 
The German election of 22 September 2013 has, much as many expected, shuffled the cards 
dramatically in terms of the country’s party politics. Rarely have so many parties experienced 
such a dramatic rise and fall in their fortunes within the space of one parliamentary cycle. Fur-
thermore, changes in the long-standing dynamics that underpin the performance of both the 
CDU and SPD have continued. German party politics remains, in other words, anything other 
than dull.   
 
We begin by briefly outlining what happened on election day before moving on to analyse the 
key factors that help to explain that outcome.  We explain that the CDU/CSU did an impressive 
job of keeping more or less all substantive debate out of the campaign, choosing to stress the 
predominant position of Chancellor Angela Merkel both within the parties of the centre-right 
(the CDU and CSU) and within German politics as a whole. They wanted Merkel to be seen as 
epitomising German politics. They got their wish. The smaller coalition partner, the Free Demo-
crats, struggled to profile itself in any meaningful way whilst the Social Democrats failed to per-
suade anyone other than their core supporters that they had a new vision for the country. The 
Greens struggled to do much the same, ultimately fighting a campaign that centred on damage 
limitation as a decidedly surreal discussion around thirty year old paedophilia claims and whether 
a national vegetarian day should be introduced blew them off course. The Left Party, meanwhile, 
had a much quieter campaign, stressing its traditional social justice and pacifist stances, and it 
was rewarded with a solid enough 8 per cent.  Had both new upstarts, the libertarian ‘Pirate Par-
ty’ and the Euro-detesting ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD), got over 5 per cent of the vote (and 
it nearly did), then Germany’s cards wouldn’t have been ‘mixed’ so much as flung all over the 
floor. These changes are not one off events. Indeed, they are based in long-term structural 
changes within the German party system. Change, in other words, might become the new stabil-
ity.   
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The Result 
The election of 22 September 2013 saw five parties enter the federal parliament in Berlin.  Ange-
la Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) led the way with an impressive 34.1 
per cent of the vote which, when added to the 7.4 per cent of the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, 
the Christian Social Union (CSU), saw the parties of the centre-right total an impressive 41.5 per 
cent.  This enabled them to send 311 MPs to parliament; 19 short of an overall majority, but 
nonetheless in a strategically strong position.  The centre-right Social Democratic Party of Ger-
many (SPD) performed better than it did in 2009, but given that that particular performance was 
their worst in modern history, that was hardly surprising.  The SPD’s 25.7 per cent (and with that 
192 MPs) was subsequently viewed by those inside and outside of the party as a(nother) poor 
performance.  The other two parties to return to the Bundestag, the Left Party and the Greens, 
will have been quietly satisfied with their performances.  The Left Party’s vote share may well 
have dropped by 3.3 per cent, but their 2009 performance was never likely to be one that they 
could seriously hope to repeat in 2013.  Given that, 8.6 per cent and 64 MPs was a result that 
most LP members could live with.  The Greens, meanwhile, had slipped from opinion poll highs 
of around 25 per cent little more than 12 months previously to end on 8.4 per cent of the vote 
and 63 parliamentarians.  Disappointed though many Greens undoubtedly were at the party’s 
inability to make electoral capital out of its mid-term popularity (based largely on the fallout 
from a nuclear accident in Japan and on high-profile local successes in one of Germany’s south-
ern regions), they remained solidly in parliament.  And that, given that the party had suffered the 
trauma of leaving parliament through the 5 per cent trap door once before (in 1990), was enough 
for many. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Results of the September 2013 parliamentary election in Germany 
 2013 2009 Change 
Absolute in % Seats Absolute in % Seats in % Seats 
Electorate 61,903,903 - - 62,168,489 - - - - 
Turnout 44,289,652 71.5 - 44,005,575 70,8 - 0.8 - 
Seats - - 630 - - 622 - 8 
CDU/CSU 18,157,256 41.5 311 14,685,515 33,8 239 7.4 72 
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CDU 14,913,921 34.1 255 11,828,277 27,3 194 6.9 61 
CSU 3,243,335 7.4 56 2,830,238 6,5 45 0.9 11 
SPD 11,247,283 25.7 192 9,990,488 23,0 146 2.7 46 
Left Party 3,752,577 8.6 64 5,155,933 11,9 76 -3.3 -12 
Greens 3,690,314 8.4 63 4,643,272 10,7 68 -2.3 -5 
FDP 2,082,305 4.8 - 6,316,080 14,6 93 -9.8 -93 
Alternative for 
Germany 
2,052,372 4.7 - - - - - - 
Pirate Party 958,507 2.2 - 847,870 2,0 - 0.2 - 
National Democratic 
Party of Germany 
560,660 1.3 - 635,525 1,5 - -0.2 - 
Republicans 91,660 0.2 - 193,396 0,4 - -0.2 - 
Free Voters 422,857 1.0 - - - - - - 
Others 686,683 1.6 - 930,111 2,1 - -0.5 - 
 
Source: Preliminary official results (http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de) / Authors’ own compilation 
 
 
The same cannot be said for the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP).  For the first time in post-
war history the FDP failed to hurdle the 5 per cent barrier and it is subsequently no longer repre-
sented in the federal parliament.  The Free Democrats ultimately suffered from a series of gaffes 
made within government, and from their ineffectual attempts to reinvent themselves under new 
leader Philip Rösler.  It came as no surprise when Rösler, and indeed his whole leadership team, 
stepped down soon after election day. 
 
Normally, the also-rans in German elections are hardly worth mentioning.  They tend to be a 
ragtag mixture of single issue parties and extremists.  In 2013, however, two new(ish) actors did 
plenty to unnerve their more well-established opponents, and that even though both ultimately 
failed to gain federal representation.  The shooting star of the previous three years, the Pirate 
Party, couldn’t build on previous regional successes in Berlin and only polled 2.2 per cent.  Ulti-
mately, this was a major disappointment to the Pirates, representing little more than 0.2 per cent 
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more than they polled in 2009.  Indeed, in an opinion poll of April 2012 every second respond-
ent wanted to see the Pirates in the Bundestag (Infratest dimap 2012).  A series of internal scan-
dals did little to help their cause, and their chances of making a breakthrough have now almost 
certainly passed. A new centre-right Eurosceptic party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), per-
formed more impressively, but it too ultimately failed to achieve the 5 per cent needed to gain 
representation in the Bundestag.  4.8 per cent represented a good performance from what was 
effectively a standing start, and it is plausible that the AfD will use this as a springboard to suc-
cess elsewhere (most noticeably the EP elections in May 2014).  The AfD is not per se anti-
European, its main aim is simply to see Germany leave the Eurozone – and so its success is al-
most certainly going to be linked with how the Eurocrisis plays out over the next few years.  The 
performances of the Pirates and the AfD contributed to the fact that never in modern German 
history have so many votes been case for parties that are not represented in parliament. The 
FDP and the AfD alone garnered over four million votes (9.5 per cent), and over a sixth of all 
votes cast went to parties that are not present in the Bundestag.  Given Germany’s history, this is 
not a statistic of which many Germans are proud. 
 
The impact of a ‘new’ electoral system 
The German election of 2013 was held under a newly revised set of electoral rules.  How many 
Germans were actually aware of this is, however, a moot point.  To be fair to the German voters, 
the vast majority of the rules that were in place in 2009 remained so in 2013, but there were 
some important – and potentially highly significant – nuances.   
 
Since 2002 the German Parliament has theoretically been home to 598 MPs.  That represents a 
reduction from the 656 MPs that were returned in 1998.  299 of the MPs are elected in single 
member constituencies and the rest are returned via closed party lists from the sixteen German 
states.   The mixed-member proportional system subsequently keeps constituency links, but is 
ultimately representative of the parties’ vote share across the country as a whole.   
 
Things begin to get complicated when you look under the surface and analyse the more specific 
outcomes that the German electoral system can produce.  The rather delicate mathematical bal-
ancing act that the German version of MMP inevitably is can on occasion lead to the strange 
anomaly of a party gaining more directly elected candidates in a state than it should theoretically 
be allowed to send to the Bundestag.  The SPD, for example, won every one of the thirteen con-
stituency seats in Brandenburg in 2005 – yet, in terms of the proportion of second votes that it 
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received, it should have been permitted to send only ten MPs to the Bundestag from that state.  
When such anomalies occur – and they have occurred ever more frequently in recent years – the 
party simply keeps the extra seats that it is lucky enough to obtain.  In 2009 the CDU/CSU won 
24 surplus seats (Überhangmandate) across Germany in this way, while the SPD did not win any.  
However, given that the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition already possessed 308 of the 598 seats the 
CDU/CSU’s ‘bonus seats’ largely went unnoticed.  Much the same happened in 2005, when the 
SPD actually won more surplus seats than the CDU/CSU (nine versus seven).  In 2002, howev-
er, the SPD won four and the CDU/CSU one.  And, given that the 2002 election proved to be a 
very close one, with the CDU/CSU and SPD both polling 38.5 per cent of second votes, the 
three extra seats won by the SPD played a major role in giving the incumbent SPD–Green gov-
ernment a stable, albeit slim, majority in parliament.  These quirks have prompted a number of 
organisations to complain that the rules on surplus seats should be reformed, and in July 2008 
the Federal Constitutional Court (BvG) ruled this dynamic to be unconstitutional and subse-
quently demanded that the electoral laws be changed by 30 June 2011.  The BvG’s reasoning was 
that parts of the electoral law did not lead to every vote being nominally equal and, indeed, there 
were even scenarios where a vote for a party could lead to that party having fewer seats in parlia-
ment. 
 
That the parties initially struggled to reach a compromise on what a new law should look like was 
unsurprising; one miscalculation and a party could find itself on the wrong end of the technicali-
ties of the electoral law for years to come.  Ultimately, however, a compromise was indeed 
found.  The parties agreed that seats would continue to be distributed according to the propor-
tion of second votes accrued.  Parties would also continue to keep any additional surplus seats 
that they were lucky (or strategically clever) enough to win.  However, a significant change came 
in that parties that did not win surplus seats would be compensated for them with so-called 
‘Ausgleichsmandate’ (or ‘equilibrium seats’).  This would ensure that proportionality in the Bun-
destag remained in line with the percentages of the vote that the parties achieved on election day.  
The one apparent danger here was that if there were a significant number of surplus seats – and 
history showed that that could indeed happen – then the parliament could increase in size quite 
considerably, and reducing the number of MPs had been a stated aim of parties in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s.  In reality, the 2013 election didn’t live up to these expectations, and a rise of 8 
(from 622 in 2009 to 630) hardly represented the crossing of a threshold of apparent unwieldi-
ness.  Whether the new system has the same effect in 2017 remains, of course, very much to be 
seen. 
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The Parties and the Campaign 
The CDU/CSU centred their campaign almost completely round their candidate for Chancellor; 
the incumbent, Angela Merkel.  Merkel remained widely respected (if not necessarily widely 
loved), and the opposition Social Democrats found it very difficult indeed to profile their candi-
date, Peer Steinbrück, against her.  Through the campaign the CDU talked little about substan-
tive policy, preferring to stress that Merkel was both a safe pair of hands and someone that 
German voters knew they could trust.  She was widely credited with leading Germany through 
the Eurocrisis relatively unscathed, and her consensual style had won many domestic plaudits.   
 
Her Social Democratic opponents would have struggled to make much of an impact on such a 
formidable opponent at the best of times, but their gaffe-prone candidate to replace her, Peer 
Steinbrück, ultimately make such a task impossible.  Steinbrück had proven to be a popular 
member of the CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition of 2005-09, and his pro-business tendencies 
were believed by many in the SPD to be their best chance of reassuring sceptical centrist voters 
about their economic competence.  However, Steinbrück’s penchant for giving well-remunerated 
speeches to the business community coupled with an ill-judged comment that the German chan-
cellor didn’t get paid enough soon turned the popular mood against him.  A rather bizarre photo 
on the front of the weekend magazine of a well-known and widely-read German daily newspaper 
(the Sueddeutsche Zeitung) of Steinbrück posing with his middle finger displayed (apparently as an 
act of defiance) did little to dispel the impression that Germany was better suited with what it 
had (i.e. Merkel) than what it might end up with (i.e. a gaffe-prone Steinbrück).   
 
 
Table 2: Opinions on the results of the chancellors debate (in Percent) 
Candidates 
Who do you 
think will per-
form better in the 
TV debate? 
Who did perform 
better in the TV 
debate? 
Who in your opinion performed… 
better worse as expected 
Merkel 30 40 10 16 74 
Steinbrück 15 33 47 13 40 
No difference 46 27 - - - 
 Who was most convincing in the area Who in the TV debate was… 
 7 
of … 
Eurocrisis Social Justice believable nice showed more 
competence 
Merkel 40 24 40 31 29 
Steinbrück 30 51 43 26 31 
No difference 27 24 33 28 38 
 
Source: Infratest dimap 2013 / Authors’ own compilation 
 
Steinbrück’s last chance to change this impression came in a widely-watched TV debate with 
Merkel.  Rarely are candidates’ debates game-changers in German elections, and 2013 proved no 
different.  27 per cent of Germans saw no difference between the candidates, and although 
Steinbrück arguably performed better than many expected, Merkel’s solid performance ensured 
that the debate had little negligible impact on the rest of the campaign. 
 
Peer Steinbrück’s failure to come across as the stronger candidate was reflected in his party’s in-
ability to seize the high ground in terms of policies.  The fact that during the previous legislative 
period the SPD had supported the CDU/CSU in all of the most significant decisions on the Eu-
rocrisis certainly didn’t help.  Indeed, the SPD’s claims that Merkel was making the Eurocrisis 
worse sounded decidedly hollow.   Data from Infrastest Dimap shows that it was only in the are-
as of social justice and health that the SPD was viewed to be more competent than the 
CDU/CSU (see table 3). 
 
Table 3: Party competence 
 
CDU / 
CSU 
SPD FDP LEFT GREEN 
Neither 
Party / 
 don’t know 
Economic competence 57 21 4 1 2 13 
Deal with international conflicts 54 20 3 3 4 15 
Create new jobs 48 26 2 3 3 16 
Good financial and budgetary policies 46 25 3 2 4 19 
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Solve the Eurocrisis 42 18 1 2 2 33 
Education policy 38 30 3 4 7 17 
Taxes 33 29 5 4 3 24 
Family-orientated policies 32 32 2 5 11 16 
Pensions 31 31 2 5 3 27 
Health 29 33 4 2 8 22 
Social Justice 26 40 2 8 5 16 
Energy policy 23 23 2 4 22 25 
 
 
Source: Infratest dimap 2013 DeutschlandTREND September 2013 
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The CDU/CSU’s programmatic and personality strengths did not, however, mean that every-
thing was plain-sailing.  Indeed, the CDU/CSU faced one very specific challenge – that of who it 
actually intended to govern with.  The centre-right’s previous coalition partner, the FDP, looked 
from the opinion polls as if it were going to struggle to re-enter parliament.  That position was 
not in and of itself an unusual one; on several occasions in the past the Free Democrats had 
been close to leaving the Bundestag, but each and every time the party managed to persuade 
enough erstwhile CDU (or SPD) voters to support it – largely on the pretext that it would be the 
best way of ensuring that their preferred party would be able to craft a governmental majority.  
However, early on in the 2009-2013 legislative period the FDP made a number of high-profile 
policy mistakes and voters were not keen to forget them.  In the 2009 election campaign, for ex-
ample, the Free Democrats promised that if they were to re-enter government then they would 
reduce taxes.  They didn’t, they increased a number of them.  The Free Democrats were also 
party to an increase in VAT, with one of the notable exceptions to this being the hotel industry – 
an industry that had long been known to offer financial support to the Free Democrats.  A 
number of personnel issues further alienated German voters, leaving the FDP battling for par-
liamentary survival. 
 
Given that polling an overall majority of the votes was unlikely, this left Angela Merkel in the 
rather unenviable position of knowing that the best the CDU/CSU could hope for was a Grand 
Coalition with the SPD. Brief flirtations with the Greens at regional level had been largely un-
successful, and although CDU/CSU-Green remained – for some at least – a long-term option, 
that was not an option in 2013.  The SPD, meanwhile, officially declared that it was trying to 
achieve a second rendition of the Red-Green coalition that had governed Germany between 
1998-2005.  Whilst the coalition was widely seen to have been a success (and that despite a rather 
undignified end), there was one simple problem; it never looked like the maths was going to add 
up.  If the Social Democrats and Greens were to have chosen to bring the Left Party in to the 
coalition equation, then the picture would have been different, but the LP’s foreign policies (it 
still, officially at least, wants to abolish NATO) and the very existence of Oskar Lafonatine (a 
former SPD leader and minister in the first red-green government who left the SPD to ultimately 
join the LP) ensured that that was not a realistic alternative.  It may be in 2017, but this was a 
coalition whose time had almost certainly not yet come.   
 
Tabelle 4: Which coalition would be good for Germany? (Exit poll) 
CDU/CSU + SPD + CDU/CSU + CDU/CSU CDU/CSU + SPD + SPD + 
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SPD GREENS FDP GREENS GREENS + 
LEFT 
GREENS + 
FDP 
57 43 41 36 27 24 12 
 
Source: infratest-dimap.de / authors own compilation 
 
The German people, meanwhile, did not seem to be hankering after wholesale change.  Indeed, 
51 per cent of citizens were happy with the performance of the federal government (the highest 
rating since 1994) and one clear constant that came out of all the polling in the run up to election 
day was that whatever coalition developed afterwards, the Germans wanted Angela Merkel to be 
leading it!   In terms of preferred coalition options, the Germans took a decidedly liberal stance.  
CDU/CSU and FDP (i.e. the current government) only came in in third place, well behind the 
most popular option of a Grand Coalition between CDU/CSU und SPD. If Germans wanted 
change, then they wanted only a small change with a move back to a coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) 
that they already knew well.   
 
Who voted for whom? 
Table 5 illustrates the major aggregate patterns of change evident in the 2013 election.  The 
CDU did well across the board, attracting overall around 210,000 voters from the Social Demo-
crats and 420,000 from the Greens.  Given that these parties represented its main centrist chal-
lengers, this is a not inconsiderable achievement, and they more than compensate for the 
290,000 voters that the CDU/CSU lost to the new, upstart Alliance for Germany.  The major 
influx of voters for the CDU/CSU nonetheless clearly came from the FDP – over 2.1 million 
former Free Democrats voted for the CDU/CSU in 2013.  Quite whether it is fair to call these 
voters ‘former Free Democrats’ remains a moot point, largely as many FDP voters have been 
seen as ‘borrowed’ votes in the first place, but it remains clear that an awful lot of disillusioned 
FDP voters turned their back on the liberals in 2013.  Indeed, it wasn’t just the CDU/CSU that 
benefited, as 530,000 previous FDP supporters voted SPD, 170,000 voted Green and 430,000 
voted AfD.  90,000 even voted for the socialist Left Party.   
 
Table 5: Voter transition at the parliamentary election in Germany 2013 (in thousands) 
From… - to… 
 
CDU/CSU SPD FDP GREENS LEFT AfD Non-voters 
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CDU/CSU - -210 -2,110 -420 -120 290 -1,130 
SPD 210 - -530 -550 -370 180 -360 
FDP 2,110 530 - 170 90 430 460 
GREENS 420 550 -170 - -40 90 40 
LEFT 120 370 -90 40 - 340 320 
AfD -290 -180 -430 -90 -340 - -240 
Non-voters 1,130 360 -460 -40 -320 240 - 
 
Source: de.statista.com / authors own compilation 
 
Even though the SPD lost votes to the CDU/CSU, it did gain 550,000 from the Greens and 
370,000 from the Left Party.  A positive reading of this would see the Social Democrats as slow-
ly making up ground that they lost to these parties in 2005 and 2009, but progress remains wor-
ryingly slow for Germany’s oldest party.  The Left Party, meanwhile, lost votes across the board, 
but it too is probably now in a more realistic long-term position that it was in 2009.  The key to 
LP success will be keeping this core of 8 per cent of the vote when the SPD (eventually) starts to 
push up towards the 30/35 per cent mark in the polls.   
 
Government Formation 
It normally takes time to form a government in Germany, and 2013 was no different with Ange-
la Merkel not being sworn in as chancellor until 17 December – almost three months after the 
election took place.   It had not, however, taken Merkel long to speak to the SPD about forming 
a possible coalition.  According to some reports, Merkel spoke to the SPD’s leader, Sigmar Ga-
briel, about taking this option forward little more than 24 hours after the final ballots had been 
cast.  Neither party formally said that this was their preferred option and both took time to re-
view their respective options.  The SPD in particular was wary of joining forces with Merkel for 
a second time, and that largely as she’d proven so adept at out-manoeuvring them at the 2009 
election.  If the SPD leadership was going to convince the party membership that this was an 
option that made sense, then it had work to do. 
 
The SPD executive nonetheless opted to enter talks with Merkel’s CDU and the Bavarian CSU 
with the proviso that they would seek the support of the SPD membership for any deal struck.  
Whether the SPD has now started a trend that will be continued in 2017 remains to be seen, but 
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the chances are that the Social Democrats themselves are certainly likely to have to do this each 
and every time from now on.  The Greens, for their part, were officially open to talks with the 
parties of the centre-right, but few people on either side thought that they had a realistic chance 
of success.  Too much bad blood existed from the failed black-green experiment in the city-state 
of Hamburg for this to be a realistic option this time round and the CSU in particular made it 
clear that it was not willing to enter in to any agreement with the Greens.  The Greens, for their 
part, quickly announced that they would not be talking to the Left Party – therefore ruling out 
any option for an SPD-led red-red-green coalition.  The options were shrinking predictably fast.   
 
Formal talks between the SPD and CDU/CSU subsequently began in early October and after 
five weeks of detailed negotiations the two parties reached agreement.  Little in the new pro-
gramme was genuinely eye-opening, although the new government plans to bring in a national 
minimum hourly wage of €8.50 (in 2015).  Once, on 14 December, 76 per cent of SPD members 
voted to support the deal, all the barriers had been cleared and the new government was able to 
take office.   
 
Conclusion 
On the face of it, the new German government promises to be little different to the old one.  
The SPD is an altogether different party to the FDP, but the coalition agreement contains little 
that marks anything like a radical shift.  Many of the cabinet faces are well-known and represent 
little that is substantively new; much of the new government’s policy package has more continui-
ty about it than it does change. 
 
However, if one scratches below the surface, then the tectonic plates of German politics may 
well be shifting.  The SPD remains stuck in the 20 per cent ghetto, and the LP and Greens have 
established themselves as long-term actors within the party system.  One cornerstone of continu-
ity, the FDP, faces an uncertain future whilst a new positively un-German-like Eurosceptic (with 
the emphasis on the ‘sceptical of the Euro’ part) party has made an impact.  Whether the AfD 
will be around in 2017 remains to be seen, but one thing is clear; the era of the two-and-a-half 
party system is well and truly dead, and fluid party system dynamics would appear to be the new 
normality.   
 
 
